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A NEW CHALLENGE  
FOR KOSOVO’S EMERGING DEMOCRACY 
 
Adrian Zeqiri 
 
 
On 23 October 2004, elections for the central institutions of Kosovo were held for the 
second time. According to CoE and OSCE observers, the elections were held in a free 
and fair environment and there were no irregularities in the process.  
Shortly after the publication of the election results, LDK (the largest party) and AAK, 
(a party stemming from former KLA structures) announced their decision to form a 
coalition government. This decision points to a number of new factors that may shape 
future political developments in Kosovo, set against a backdrop of urgent Standards 
implementation and future status negotiations. 
 
The NATO-led intervention in 1999 established the territory as a UN protectorate, 
under charge of the international community in all major spheres of life. Since then 
Kosovo has seen a gradual empowerment of local institutions over a period of four 
elections, both municipal and central. The 2004 central elections were organized 
largely by local institutions, reflecting the ability of Kosovo actors to successfully 
adopt responsibility for the running of the territory. Unlike the previous broad-based 
coalition government emerging from the 2001 elections, the recent agreement between 
LDK and AAK sees parties taking up positions of power and opposition within the 
new assembly. This constellation presents a new challenge for the fragile political 
environment of Kosovo. The international community may now be faced with a more 
confrontational political landscape and the more politicized Albanian politicians will 
be tested to function within this new arrangement. This report serves to analyse the 
election results and their implications for the formation of a Kosovo assembly. It will 
further discuss the impact of these developments in the current and upcoming intensive 
political period in Kosovo.  
 
Election Results 
The OSCE and Central Election Commission announced the final election results on 3 
November 2004. These results display slight, but significant, differences compared 
with the previous elections held in 2001.  
The results read and compare as follow: 
  
2004       2001 
Turn out 53.6%  Seats   64% 
 
LDK  45.4  47   45.6 
PDK  28.9  30   25.7 
AAK  8.4    9   7.8 
ORA  6.2    7   \ 
PSHDK 1.8    2   1 
KDTP  1.2    1 
PD  1    1 
KV  .72    1 
LPK  .66    1 
PLK  .51    1 
Others  5.2 
 2
In addition to the 100 seats contestable by election, 20 seats are reserved to guarantee 
minority representation in parliament.  Both KDTP and KV have each taken 2 of these 
seats, further to their respective electoral gains. The remaining set-aside seats have 
been allocated to C?KM (8), IRDK (2), Citizen’s Initiative Serbia (2), PDAK (1), 
SDA (1), GIG (1), and PREBK (1).  
 
While LDK remained the single most popular party among Albanian voters in Kosovo, 
it has seen a decline in support. Both PDK and AAK witnessed a rise in support. 
Perhaps the greatest surprise was caused by the 6.2% electoral gain of the new 
citizen’s list, ORA. 
 
The results made clear that none of the parties approached the 61-seat majority 
required for the formation the government in the Assembly. Post-election speculation 
thus focused on possible coalitions that could be formed. Parties were reportedly given 
a certain timeframe to reach an agreement. In the absence of fulfillment, UNMIK 
would step into the negotiation process.  
 
Negotiating a Coalition for Government 
The four main political parties, LDK, PDK, AAK and ORA made initial contacts on 
the possibility of forming the new government. As expected, UNMIK did not take an 
active role in the process. The three major political parties (LDK, PDK, AAK) claimed 
that this time there would be no need for intervention by the international community. 
Senior politicians proclaim a level of political maturity in Kosovo and remained 
confident that consensus could be reached.  
With a fast-approaching deadline which threatened UNMIK intervention, primary 
speculation focused on a possible LDK/AAK agreement. This came to fruition on 17 
November when the LDK-AAK-PSHDK coalition was announced. AAK leader, 
Ramush Haradinaj, is controversially to take up the post of Prime Minister. The 
LDK/AAK agreement will see LDK with the posts of Assembly Speaker and 
President.  In accordance with the Constitutional Framework, both Haradinaj and 
Rugova will be obliged to resign their positions as respective party leaders. This, in 
turn, may create some turmoil within their parties.  
 
Details of Coalition Government 
On Monday, 22 November, the parties in coalition agreed upon the details of the 
division of government and other posts.  According to the agreement, LDK will be 
assigned the following posts: President, Assembly Speaker, and six Ministries: 
Education, Culture, Youth and Sports, Public Services, Local Government, Economy 
and Finance, Post and Telecommunications. AAK, on the other hand, will attain the 
posts of Prime Minister and four Ministries: Energy, Environment and Spatial 
Planning, Social Welfare and Trade and Industry. Although not part of the coalition 
agreement, Kosovo Serb representatives will lead two ministries, namely those of 
Returns and Communities and Agriculture, as a quota requirement of the 
Constitutional Framework. The non-Serb communities will lead the Ministry of 
Health.   
The first inaugural session of the new Assembly was scheduled to take place  on 2 
December 2004.   
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Events leading to the coalition agreement 
The Kosovo Albanian political scene has come to be characterized by the division into 
two camps since 1999. On the one hand, there are those parties who supported the 
KLA war, namely PDK, AAK and other minor parties. On the other hand, those 
parties seen as not supporting the KLA war are include LDK and some smaller parties 
close to it. PDK has utilized this perceived position of LDK to denounce the party as 
not acting in the interests of Kosovo Albanians. PDK and LDK have thus become rival 
parties.  
AAK has, for the most part, been seen as a sister party to PDK. Analysts agree that 
Ramush Haradinaj’s decision to enter into coalition with LDK is partly motivated by 
the fact that his possible indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) will be complicated by the PM position. A broad-based 
government including PDK would have excluded him from the Premiership.  
The LDK decision is perceived to be motivated by the desire to take more ministerial 
positions. Moreover, a broad-based government could have seen PDK President, 
Hashim Thaqi, as PM. LDK has nevertheless signed to an agreement that is 
disproportional to the election results: AAK, with only 8% of votes, has taken over 
30% of governmental positions. It is believed that the position of PM, which would 
normally go to the largest party in the coalition, has been “sacrificed” for the position 
of President. The presidency has been reserved for the resumption of LDK’s Ibrahim 
Rugova, who sees himself as a popular leader. The position of President is largely 
symbolic and does not carry any executive power.  
 
Reactions to Coalition Agreement 
Reactions to the coalition agreement have been foreshadowed by the reality that 
AAK’s Ramush Haradinaj will become Prime Minister. Amidst coalition negotiations, 
Haradinaj was interviewed by the ICTY in Pristina regarding his combat activities as a 
commander of the KLA in 1998-99. Following this, Haradinaj stated that he had 
cleared his position and he would not be required for further interviews. However, it is 
speculated that his case with the ICTY has not been concluded.  
While headlines have conflicted over UNMIK’s reaction to the new coalition, an 
official statement from SRSG Jessen-Petersen welcomed “the fact that consultations 
among Kosovo’s political parties have resulted in an agreement on the formation of a 
coalition”. Commenting on the nomination of Ramush Haradinaj for the PM post, he 
said: “If I say no to his nomination I will say no to democracy”, thus making clear that 
he will not intervene in the process.  
However, a more critical viewpoint has come from EU Foreign Affairs Representative, 
Javier Solana. He was quoted on 22 November as saying that a former ethnic-Albanian 
rebel leader under investigation for war crimes might not be the "most appropriate" 
man to lead Kosovo: "As far as we're concerned, our number one priority is to work on 
the standards issue … Whoever the prime minister, he has to work on the standards 
issue and if in the end the prime minister is somebody who has to go to The Hague, he 
may not be the most appropriate person to work towards those standards.” 
Reactions from Belgrade have also been of a negative nature. Ramush is seen only as a 
war criminal to be indicted by the Hague Tribunals. Kosovo Serb reactions have 
generally been cautious. However, Oliver Ivanovic, head of SLKM, one of the two 
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Kosovo Serb parties represented in parliament, said, “fulfilling standards and moving 
ahead with decentralization are areas where the new government should focus”.  
 
As expected, harshest criticism of the coalition agreement has come from the PDK. 
Though officially refraining from harsh words, Epoka e Re, a daily newspaper close to 
PDK, talked of “Ramush’s treason” of wartime friends. PDK have stated that they are 
“skeptical towards the sustainability of the agreement”. On Monday, 22 November, the 
so-called association of war veterans, closely associated with PDK, staged a protest in 
the center of Prishtina in support of other former KLA Commanders being prosecuted 
at the UN Hague Tribunal. Though officially not linked to the formation of 
government, its very timing has proven to be a tool of support for the PDK. 
 
ORA’s head, Veton Surroi, has said that the coalition is fragile and it is doomed to fail. 
He did, however, express best wishes to the new government.  
 
Democratic Functioning in Kosovo 
It would be futile to try to predict how the new government will function. The previous 
government, accommodating different parties from the entire Kosovo spectrum, was 
weak. Policy-making was largely characterized by scattered initiatives coming from 
ministries led by different parties. The Office of the PM (OPM) thus failed to assume a 
leading role. The biggest impediment to coordination on the part of the OPM was the 
failure to transmit policies through the ministries. As such, ministries often appeared to 
act in opposition to one another in the absence of leadership from the OPM. 
 
It is hoped that the new government will function efficiently and in a cooperative 
manner. The authority of the OPM will thus need to be strengthened. While an official 
programme of government has not yet been publicized, a draft programme was leaked 
to the press in the days immediately following the announcement of a coalition 
agreement. This draft proclaims that the government will be “wholeheartedly and 
thoroughly committed to achieving Standards for Kosovo up to mid-2005”.  It further 
reaffirms its commitment to fulfil all necessary standards towards establishing Kosovo 
as an independent state.  
 
Kosovo Serb turnout in the central elections was very low. Despite two Serbian parties 
competing in the elections, the call from Serbian politicians and Serb Orthodox Church 
leaders to boycott was very formidable. Represented only by set-aside seats, it remains 
to be seen whether Kosovo Serb representatives will take up their two Ministerial 
positions and qualitatively engage in governance.  
 
Functioning of the new government is confronted by an era of increased political 
tension and controversy between those parties in power and those in opposition. The 
formation of an alliance between PDK and ORA is now highly probable. Combining 
PDK zeal and readiness to criticize with ORA’s access to media and substantive 
critique of government policy, a very strong and vocal opposition may be in the 
making.  
 
Status Negotiations  
Any serious status negotiation process will have to include all major parties and 
minority representatives. It is therefore clear that the executive branch of the 
government, run by two parties, will not assume a leading position in the status 
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negotiations. There will be a strong move from PDK to engage the Assembly generally 
in the process whereby all parties are represented and thus influential in negotiation. 
The fact that PDK is in opposition will inevitably result in a more radical position in 
that process. It will be much harder for the International Community to get the PDK to 
acquiesce on any decision regarding status. Inevitably, PDK will want to fabricate a 
conciliatory image of the governing parties, accusing them of making too many 
concessions on final status 
The non-participation of Serbs in the elections will only serve to complicate the status 
negotiations due to a lack of credible Kosovo Serb representation in the process. 
 
Conclusions 
It remains to be seen how the International Community will accept Ramush Haradinaj 
as Kosovo PM. Initial reactions have not been entirely positive. On the other hand, 
international and local institutions will have to cooperate on the pressing issues of 
standards and status, the PM personality notwithstanding.  
Should Ramush Haradinaj be indicted the security situation in Kosovo is likely to 
deteriorate with great possibilities of tension and riots. Converse to vocal, critical 
assessment of government, the PDK reaction to such an event may be one of passive 
observer.  
The possible indictment and its consequences will impede the process of standards 
implementation and status negotiation. Legally, Haradinaj’s position will be assumed 
by the deputy PM.  
 
On the other hand, there is the opportunity for the new government to make bold and 
progressive decisions, as it is no longer bound by an inflexible broad-based agreement. 
Finally, it is up to the Albanian political parties to display a political maturity by being 
able to work in such an environment. This may be accomplished by parties in power to 
involve opposition as much as possible and to treat them as an opponent rather than as 
an enemy. Conversely, parties in opposition will have to engage in a constructive 
government critique.  
 
 
 
 
